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ABSTRACT 
This note is a final response to the debate raised by Mr. Castles and Mr. Henderson
(for brevity, we refer here to the two authors simply as C&H) in this Journal (vol
14, no 2&3, and no 4) on the issue of economic growth in developing countries in
some of the emissions scenarios published in the IPCC Special Report on
Emissions Scenarios (SRES) (Nakicenovic et al., 2000). We first outline areas of
agreement and then the remaining areas of disagreement. Two important areas of
agreement have emerged from the debate according to our view. 
First, both parties agree that scenarios assuming a conditional convergence in
income levels, i.e., a higher growth in per capita income in poorer countries when
compared to countries with higher levels of affluence, are both “plausible and well
attested in economic history” (C&H, p. 424). Thus, the fundamental, structural
characteristic of some of the SRES scenarios contested by C&H are not challenged
per se, but rather how fast such trends could unfold in the future. 
Second, there is agreement on the value of considering purchasing power
parities (PPP) in the international comparison of income levels and the need for
further research to improve on the paucity of reliable PPP estimates for developing
countries within the International Comparisons Project (ICP) (C&H, p. 432). We
appreciate that C&H have now acknowledged that PPPs were considered in
developing the SRES scenarios and that they are reported in the data appendix of
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Xing.
the report (C&H, p. 422-423). Thus, it was not ignorance as suggested by C&H but
rather sound empirical and methodological reasons that led the SRES team to use
market exchange rates (MER) as the main metric in developing long-term
emissions scenarios. This is in agreement with the underlying scenario literature.
However, we do agree with C&H on the value of considering PPP as a
complementary metric, and have indeed reported corresponding PPP scenarios in
SRES. We disagree with C&H that PPP ought to be used as the sole measure in
developing long-term emissions scenarios.
This leads us to the remaining areas of disagreement.
(1) An important area of disagreement is that emissions do not depend on the
metric used to measure economic activities. Evidently, historical emissions do not
change as a function of whether historical development is measured in PPP or MER
and both measures can be used interchangeably given appropriate model calibrations
are deployed to assess the resulting emissions. More importantly, future emissions
depend first of all on the physical characteristics of the energy system, land use and
other human activities that need to be represented in models to calculate future
emissions of greenhouse gases. These physical model representations are unaffected
by the choice of PPP or MER for measuring economic growth. This fact explains
why many of the emissions scenarios in the literature do not include economic
development paths but rather determine emissions from human activities, such as
energy and food services. We have addressed this argument extensively in the earlier
issue of this Journal (vol 14, no 2&3).
(2) There also remains an important disagreement on the issue of using market
exchange rates (MER) GDP in developing emission scenarios. C&H hold the
extreme view that MER – a directly observable economic variable, as opposed to
PPP, which is an elaborate statistical construct – should not be used at all in
economic comparisons and in developing scenarios of GDP growth. We reiterate that
there are good theoretical, methodological, and empirical reasons for using MER.
Contrary to their claim of “unsound” practices, the SRES scenarios are consistent
with the underlying literature, available methodologies, and existing practices of
economic growth projections of leading international (e.g., the World Bank) and
national institutions (e.g., the US DOE Energy Information Administration).
(3) A final area of disagreement is whether the C&H criticism is significant or a
“red herring”. C&H (p. 428-429) claim that by lowering the economic growth rates
for developing countries in the lowest SRES emission-scenarios, one should obtain
even lower future emissions. Thus, they claim that the SRES scenarios have failed
to represent the lower bound of uncertainty of future emission levels. Here C&H
display either a misunderstanding or misrepresentation of economic activity as the
sole, independent driver of future emissions. Higher economic growth generally
results in higher R&D, more rapid capital turnover, more energy efficiency and
higher preferences for pollution controls, all of which tend to reduce GHG
emissions. Depending on how these are modeled, lower GDP growth may actually
result in higher GHG emissions, and may not, as C&H contend, significantly lower
the SRES emissions in the absence of climate policies. We disagree that lower
economic development would necessarily result in lower emissions. 
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We conclude our response with some suggestions for improved clarity in the
debate and the need to quantify differences in opinion through alternative
scenarios published in the peer-reviewed literature. 
1. INTRODUCTION
Previous issues of this Journal (vol 14, no 2&3, and no 4) have presented a debate
publicly initiated by C&H (Mr. Castles and Mr. Henderson) on the appropriate
economic metric and numerical values for long-term economic growth scenarios
within the context of long-term greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions scenarios as
presented in the IPCC Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES). The present
note is a concluding rejoinder to the last article by C&H that appeared in vol 14, no 4,
pp. 415-435 of this Journal in which C&H have restated their arguments at
considerable length, in part responding to our earlier exchange (vol 14, no 2&3).
Our comments will be brief, as we do not believe that voluminous repetition lends
any additional credence to the arguments we consider have already been dispelled in
our previous exchanges with C&H.
As a reminder to the readers of this Journal, the present debate centers around the
issue of economic growth in developing countries as modeled in SRES. C&H have
accused the SRES authors and the IPCC as a whole of acting in a professionally
“unsound” manner. According to their view, long-term economic growth must solely be
described using purchasing power parities (PPP), rather than market exchange rates
(MER), for comparing gross domestic products (GDP) of different world regions. C&H
also contend that the growth rates assumed in some of the SRES scenarios for
developing countries are “absurdly” high, inconsistent with historical experience and
the underlying scenario literature. We have argued that the SRES, in its use of MER,
fully reflects the state-of-the art methodology for developing such long-term scenarios.
Further, SRES did also use PPP for many of its scenarios as an alternative,
complementary metric. Regardless of whether MER or PPP is used consistently in a
comparison with the underlying scenario literature with the same metric (MER or PPP,
respectively), the SRES scenarios – contrary to the claims by C&H – do not appear at
all extreme. Rather, they reflect a wide range of future possibilities that characterize our
current understanding of the uncertainties of the drivers of future emissions patterns.
In the following sections we briefly outline our understanding of the areas of
agreement that have emerged in the debate, and the important differences that remain.
We conclude with some observations on the way C&H have conducted the debate thus
far. We feel that C&H have quoted selectively from the literature and that much greater
clarity, precision, and comprehensiveness is required in the presentation and criticism
of SRES. A peer-reviewed evaluation of their criticisms could resolve some of these
issues and help inform future emissions assessments. We also call for a more open-
minded discussion of the uncertainties associated with inevitably unknowable futures,
minimizing any preconceived ideological or methodological biases. Finally, we
emphasize the need for publication of alternative emissions scenarios in the peer-
reviewed literature, so these can be given appropriate consideration in future scientific
assessments. 
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2. AREAS OF AGREEMENT
An important area of agreement that emerged from the debate in our view is that C&H
agree with the conceptual model of conditional convergence that underlies the SRES
scenarios. We also agree that it is plausible that economic growth may proceed more
rapidly in developing countries than in the already industrialized nations. C&H
criticized the SRES for being overoptimistic on economic growth in developing
countries. They now call scenarios in which per capita incomes in poorer countries
grow faster than in high-income, mature economies, both “plausible and well attested
in economic history” (C&H, p. 424), a statement with which we also fully agree. We
emphasize here the term conditional convergence, meaning a closing of the income
gap (however measured) in relative terms only, as no SRES scenario assumes that
present disparities in per capita incomes would eventually close in absolute terms. In
fact, absolute per capita income differences continue to grow across all SRES
scenarios, this occurs independently of the metric – either MER or PPP – used to
express current income differences.2 Further, one of the four scenario families, the A2
group of scenarios, does not lead to convergence between the developed and
developing countries in per capita PPP, the current PPP income difference ratio of
about four to one being maintained throughout the 21st century.
We accept that C&H consider some SRES scenarios to be unrealistic. This
notwithstanding, it is important to emphasize that even for the most extreme scenarios
with the highest rates of economic growth, there is no disagreement on the fundamental,
structural characteristic of conditional convergence underlying the economic
development patterns of the scenario. Rather, there is disagreement on what should be
the appropriate rates of growth. The SRES scenarios were, rightly, designed to assess
the relevant uncertainties in important driving forces of future GHG emissions, and
economic development is indeed one of the most important ones. Disagreement is thus
on model parameters rather than on the conceptual model underlying the contested
SRES B1 scenario. It is particularly important to emphasize this in view of the claims
of C&H that such a scenario renders the work of SRES methodologically “unsound”. 
It is also important to reiterate at this point that the purpose of any scenario exercise
such as SRES (as opposed to a deterministic “forecast”) is not to artificially compress
future uncertainties through some subjective a priori constraints on the range of “what-
if-then” conditions that can be explored in a scenario exercise, especially relying on
criteria which a limited group deem “realistic”. The mandate for the SRES team was to
reflect the scientific uncertainty as represented by publications in the available scenario
literature. It is in this context that the high growth rates in some of the SRES scenarios
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2For instance, in the much contested SRES B1 scenario, which we agree with C&H is very optimistic, average
per capita incomes in developing countries would increase from $2,280 (PPP) in 1990 to approach some
$40,000 (PPP) per capita by 2100, about twice the current OECD average, but only about 60 percent of the
OECD average of $65,000 (PPP) per capita in 2100. In absolute terms, the gap between the average income
in developing and OECD countries increases substantially, from $14,000 (PPP) in 1990 to $24,900 in 2100. 
We also wish to add that the economic growth projections in MER of the B1 scenario were developed in
close collaboration with the Dutch Economic Planning Bureau and their WorldScan model, i.e., drawing
precisely the kind of expertise residing in national economic agencies C&H have criticized the SRES for
having insufficiently drawn upon.
criticized by C&H fulfill an important role, well inside the bounds of the underlying
literature review (cf. discussion below). All those users of the SRES scenarios,
including those who disagree with a particular subset of the range of possibilities as
outlined by the entire set of 40 scenarios, should consider the alternatives as outlined
for instance in the A2 and B2 scenario families. The SRES was designed to provide
insights on uncertainty from a range of plausible scenarios, and not to assign likelihood
to any of the alternative futures described by the set of 40 scenarios.
For an exercise assessing important uncertainties of future GHG emissions, it would
constitute a serious methodological flaw to exclude the possibility of rapid economic
development in the current developing countries. Likewise it would also constitute a
serious flaw in the analysis not to consider alternative scenario uncertainties of a rapid
or slow demographic transition, as well as rapid or slow technology developments in
either fossil fuel or renewable technologies. Censorship of which major scenario
uncertainties should be considered in the assessment would indeed be both poor science
and a poor guide to policy-makers who must consider potential trade-offs (or not)
among stated socio-economic goals for all relevant contingencies of future
developments. In the case of the SRES scenarios, the main assumptions and scenario
outcomes are both consistent with the historical experience and the underlying
literature. Indeed, C&H may have missed the main insight here – that SRES suggests
that even rapid economic growth may be compatible with low-end GHG futures. 
We now turn to the issue of economic metric, i.e., to the issue of MER versus PPP.
We agree with C&H on the value of considering PPP as an alternative measure in
cross-country comparisons of quantities such as income levels and energy intensity.
This is amply documented in the publication record of many of the SRES authors. It
is also evident in the SRES report that presents PPP results for all key SRES scenarios.
We also agree with C&H on the importance of further research to increase the number
of reliable PPP estimates for developing countries within the International
Comparisons Project (ICP) (C&H, p. 432). These are needed to address the data
inadequacies that drove SRES decisions to prefer MER as the more reliable measure
of developing scenarios of long-term economic development. There is further
agreement on the importance of complementing traditional expenditure-based PPP
estimates with estimates focusing on value-added PPP. Our agreement with C&H also
stems from our desire to explore further methodological pluralism in the field of
developing long-term emission scenarios. However, this is also the point where our
positions depart sharply.
3. AREAS OF DISAGREEMENT 
This section is divided into three subsections.
3.1 Driving forces of emissions 
As we have argued extensively in the earlier issue of this Journal (vol 14, no 2&3),
emissions do not depend on the metric used to measure economic activities. Evidently,
historical emissions do not change as a function of whether historical development is
measured in PPP or MER and both measures can be used interchangeably given
appropriate model calibration to the resulting emissions variable. This in fact is
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reflected in integrated assessment models that report both metrics of GDP such as the
IIASA integrated set of models used in SRES. More importantly, future emissions
depend on physical characteristics of the energy system, land use and other human
activities that need to be represented in models to calculate future emissions of
greenhouse gases. These physical model representations like levels and structure of
future diets or types of technologies used in electricity generation are unaffected by the
choice of the calibrating parameter for economic growth. Evidently, there are
additional economic variables that will affect consumer and producer choices as
reflected for instance in energy prices. However, as we argue below there are sound
empirical and methodological reasons to use MER exchange rates in describing prices
of internationally traded commodities. Our continued disagreement with C&H in our
view arises from the fact that C&H narrowly focus in their debate on the economic
metric for GDP growth, ignoring the essential further analytical steps in the
representation of physical systems that are needed to calculate greenhouse gas
emissions. In other words, GDP is an important, but in itself insufficient explanatory
variable for describing differences in emissions, past, present, or future. This fact
explains why many of the emissions scenarios in the literature do not include
economic development paths but rather determine emissions from human activities,
such as energy and food services. We have addressed this argument extensively in the
earlier issue of this Journal (vol 14, no 2&3).
3.2 Reasons for using MER and PPP
We appreciate that C&H now acknowledge that the SRES authors and reviewers
explicitly considered the use of PPP in the SRES report and its underlying scenario
modeling work. This fact was pointed out to C&H repeatedly, even prior to the first
critique published in this Journal. Contrary to the allegation by C&H that “flawed”
methodology was used to develop the SRES scenarios and their contention that the
omission of a primary use of PPP is the result of an ignorance among the SRES authors
and reviewers, three of us (Grübler, Nakicenovic and Rogner) have developed jointly
with other colleagues the first set of PPP-based long-term emissions scenarios in a joint
study between IIASA and the World Energy Council (Nakicenovic et al. 1998) which
was quoted by C&H as an example of how PPP can be used in such scenarios.
We are also surprised to see that C&H continue to dismiss the PPP scenarios
derived with the IIASA integrated model as mere “memorandum items” (p. 423)
despite the fact that the PPP scenarios portray exactly the features for which they call.
The SRES shows that the differences between the MER and PPP growth rates are
largest for developing regions where the two exchange rates currently differ
substantially, but are insignificant for regions in which the current differences are
small (i.e., for the OECD region).3 In other words, assuming that conditional
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3The fact that MER and PPP scenarios are identical for the OECD region simply arises from the fact that
the differences between these two measures are very small and would not affect the results substantially.
Hence, no alternative scenarios for the evolution of relative prices, e.g., of Japan versus the US over a period
of 100 years were formulated. We certainly welcome any suggestions C&H have to offer to improve upon
PPP scenarios for OECD countries, but as mentioned above the impact on aggregate scenario results will be
minor.
convergence holds, it implies much higher growth rates for MER than for PPP for
developing countries, and this is reflected in the SRES scenarios. Contrary to C&H
claims (p. 422) that the main difference between the growth rates between the two
measures is simply due to different weights in regional averages one needs to consider
the differences between MER and PPP exchange rates not only from a static
perspective (as appropriate for cross-country comparisons at any given moment in
time) but also from a dynamic perspective. The important additional factor to consider
in long-term scenarios is the tendency for factor price equalization as economies
develop and are progressively integrated into world trade for successively larger
components of their GDP, which leads to declining differences between PPP and
MER. This again is reflected in the scenarios reported in SRES as well as in the
scenario studies that report both GDP metrics, most notably those of the World Energy
Council.
It is surprising to see that C&H applaud the PPP scenarios of the World Energy
Council as exemplary, while dismissing the PPP scenarios presented in the SRES
report, as both sets of PPP scenarios were derived with exactly the same methodology
and the same integrated model. C&H correctly point out the few studies available in
the literature to date that have used PPP. Altogether C&H and we have been able to
identify only nine scenarios (cf. Table 2 below) outside SRES that report economic
growth in terms of PPP, either exclusively or as an alternative metric to MER. In
contrast, eight out of the 40 SRES scenarios report both MER and PPP. It is thus
particularly striking to see C&H short-shrifting the SRES scenarios in comparison to
those in the available scenario literature. One of the important mandates for any IPCC
document is to reflect the current state of knowledge through a careful literature
review. The SRES report reviews 416 scenarios in the literature. Of those, 166
scenarios report GDP for the year 2050, and 148 for the year 2100. In all of them –
except for the nine cases mentioned above – MER is used to describe GDP growth.
Most recent results, including a study by Manne and Richels (2003), regarding the use
of PPP and MER in measuring economic development in integrated assessment
models, confirm our position that the choice of exchange rate will have only a small
influence on the emissions and the resulting temperature in the year 2100. 
MER continues to be the most widely used metric in scenarios of future
developments of the world economy, energy use, and emissions. The SRES scenarios
therefore follow state-of-the-art, well established practices of international or national
institutions, as exemplified for instance by the World Bank (2003) Global Economic
Prospects, or the US Departments of Energy’s Energy Information Administration
(USDOE, 2003) International Energy Outlook, all published since SRES, and all using
MER.
We therefore restate that the SRES scenarios constitute an important
methodological improvement over much of the scenario literature in that GDP growth
is described therein using PPP (using one of the six integrated models that participated
in SRES) in addition to the traditional MER. In contrast to this methodological
pluralism, C&H have set out on a crusade to dislodge the use of MER, be it for
developing economic growth projections, emissions scenarios, or national
submissions to the UNFCCC. Their effort would be more productive if they would
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instead attempt to develop long-term scenarios that incorporate some of the
characteristics they claim to be essential for a more “realistic” view of future economic
development in the world.
We continue to state our case on the methodological soundness of the use of MER
for developing long-term emissions scenarios. Our reasons are both empirical and
theoretical. MER can be observed in market transactions for any currency used
anywhere globally at any instant of time, whereas PPP is a set of varying, elaborate
statistical constructs, estimated at (irregular) time intervals or for a shorter time period.
Even given the most valuable estimation efforts as performed e.g., by the ICP, there
are important uncertainties remaining and PPP time series estimates are generally
available only for shorter periods of time.4 We believe that the complex statistical
construct that PPP represents is a long way from being sufficiently reliable to serve as
the sole basis of any analysis of income comparisons in a cross section analysis, much
less serve as the sole basis of long term trend analysis. In fact the right strategy, given
these assessments, is exactly what SRES pursued-using a MER based approach with
parallel analysis using PPP to supplement the data. Given the SRES mandate to pursue
the literature, the approach of only using PPP as suggested by C&H would also have
been both inconsistent with the underlying literature and at risk of being weak on
methodological grounds, at least until the 2003-2005 work of ICP will be completed.
Even considering that with ongoing statistical work some of the uncertainty
problems can be overcome in the future with more comprehensive and reliable PPP
estimates, especially for developing countries that would not reduce the value of
information contained in MER. 
The problem at hand for emissions scenarios is not the postulation of GDP growth
scenarios in some metric, whether MER or PPP, but rather to explore the implications
that economic growth has for energy use, agricultural practices, the deployment of
technologies, and the resulting emissions. The main characteristic of energy and
technology (and to a smaller extent also food) is that these commodities are traded
globally. Hence their availability at any instant of time for a national economy cannot
be determined on the basis of PPP exchange rates but rather on the basis of MER. The
issue of trade is also of central importance for GHG emissions scenarios when various
climate policies are to be assessed as well. (Recall that the main motivation of the
SRES scenarios was to serve as a basis for the subsequent analysis of climate change
mitigation, adaptation and impacts within the framework of the IPCC assessments.)
Again carbon trade prices will be determined at the international level and not on the
basis of PPP exchange rates. 
There are thus fundamental and methodologically sound reasons why long-term
emission scenario models have to date almost exclusively relied on MER. Whereas some
models (including the IIASA integrated models) include an internal module to translate
between MER and PPP, MER continues to be indispensable. For instance, the amount of
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4E.g., the 2001 World Bank Development indicators on a CD ROM (World Bank, 2001) include country-
level GDP, MER from 1960 to 1999 and GDP, PPP estimates from 1975 to 1999, based on only 34
participating countries in 1975, 64 in 1985 (UN, 1992) and reaching a global representative level in 1993
with 118 participating countries (ICP, 2003).
oil China can import (and that may become available for domestic consumption)
depends on the prevailing level of crude oil prices at the international level. In turn, its
costs to the Chinese economy are determined by the MER of the Chinese currency and
not by the PPP exchange rate. The same can be said on the availability of jet aircraft for
the transport sector or advanced energy technologies such as combined-cycle gas
turbines. It is these among many other numerous relationships that need to be
represented to model alternative scenarios that link economic growth to growth in energy
use, changes in the technology stock of an economy and the resulting GHG emissions.
C&H claim (p. 430) that it is “a mistake to give the model-based scenario approach
such near-exclusive emphasis”, but they offer no alternative. Evidently, given
adequate PPP estimates it may be possible to formulate PPP GDP growth scenarios
relying exclusively on this measure using a simple spreadsheet. But what about the
subsequent steps in the analysis? As mentioned above, we challenge C&H to construct
long-term emission scenarios that contain: (1) all the salient information needed for
climate models on all species of GHGs arising from a multitude of human activities
and from many different sectors, and (2) all the information needed for subsequent
policy analysis such as energy (and carbon) prices and quantities. 
This would also be the only way for them to demonstrate their alleged claim that
the lowest SRES scenario in terms of cumulative carbon emissions (B1T-MESSAGE)
does not represent a lower bound of emissions5 in the absence of climate policies.
C&H have argued that by lowering the GDP growth rates of this (and similar)
scenarios, emissions levels would be reduced, presumably proportionally, although it
remains unclear what level of emission reductions C&H would expect in the case of a
substantially lowered economic growth scenario for developing countries.
3.3 Lowering economic growth
We disagree with C&H that significantly lowering the economic growth rates of
developing countries in the SRES B1T scenario would reduce emissions correspondingly.
The B1T scenario explores the upper bounds of the diffusion of non-fossil energy
technologies and results in the lowest cumulative GHG emissions of the SRES scenarios.
We disagree on theoretical and numerical grounds with the simplistic scaling perspective
that C&H advance, namely that lower GDP automatically leads to lower emissions.
There is wide agreement in both the theoretical and empirical literature of the
economics of technological change that technological progress does not come as a free
good (Grübler et al., 1999). The widespread diffusion of advanced, low- and zero-carbon
technologies that make a low-emission path, as described by the SRES B1T scenario,
feasible is in fact contingent on sustained high levels of R&D and technology deployment
in niche markets. Only under such conditions could the prices of these advanced
technologies be lowered to a level that they would become cost-competitive with
conventional fossil fuel based technologies even in absence of climate policies. It is
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5In fact, even assuming such a scenario could be developed, it would not matter for the assessment of
climate change uncertainties such as temperature change. The lower bound of future emissions is defined
by climate policy scenarios, which were explicitly excluded from SRES, but analyzed subsequently in the
IPCC Third Assessment Report (TAR).
equally a well-attested theoretical and empirical fact that diffusion rates of new
technologies are closely linked to market growth, i.e., the rate of capital turnover in an
economy (e.g., Mansfield et al., 1977; Freeman, 1994). If growth is stagnant, few
opportunities arise for the deployment of new technologies resulting in slower technology
improvement rates compared to a case with rapid capital turnover. Similar statements also
hold for energy end-use technologies (efficiency improvements). Higher macroeconomic
productivity growth (GDP per capita growth) leads to higher rates of structural change in
an economy and to higher potentials for deployment of more efficient capital vintages. As
a result, improvements in energy intensity (energy use per unit of GDP) have been
identified as being closely related to macroeconomic productivity growth (WEA, 2000).
It is because of the non-linear interdependence among variables that simplistic scaling
assumptions are both inconsistent with theory and counterfactual. 
Growth in emissions is frequently described in the literature as being the sum of
component growth rates in underlying driving forces along the so-called IPAT identity.
After some initial disagreement, C&H (p. 428) have conceded to our viewpoint on
stressing the importance of the interdependence between the IPAT variables, in other
words on the linkages between productivity growth (GDP per capita), energy intensity
(energy use per unit GDP), and emissions intensity of energy (e.g., carbon emissions
per unit energy). Despite the apparent dismissal of formal modeling by C&H, it is
precisely these models that can help shed light on the complex interplay between the
variables. We disagreed earlier with the C&H conjecture that significantly lower
economic growth rates for developing countries would reduce emissions. In fact,
lower economic growth might instead increase emissions compared to the base case.
In the meantime, we have developed a new scenario to address this question, the
results of which are summarized in Table 1. The new scenario is called simply B2P
and does not result in lower emissions than B2 that served as the base case for
lowering economic development perspectives.
Taking the original SRES B26 as a base case, we have assumed that economic
growth rates in developing countries would be substantially lower (reaching income
levels of $9,000 per capita in PPP terms by 2100 instead of the original $18,000).
Given this lower economic growth, we then used the integrated set of IIASA models
to analyze the implications for energy use (impact on energy intensity) and the
diffusion of advanced non-carbon technologies (carbon intensity). As can be seen
from Table 1, the impacts are substantial and non-linear. Lower economic growth
would lead to slower improvements in energy intensity (i.e., energy use in B2P is
significantly above those values a linear “downscaling” of GDP growth would
suggest). It also leads to a very slow diffusion of advanced technologies (practically
no improvements in carbon intensities). The resulting impact on emissions is that they
are substantially higher than in the original base-case scenario (15.5 GtC by 2100
compared to some 13.8 GtC in the original B2 scenario and that with a world GDP that
falls from 232 Trillion PPP$ in the base case B2 scenario to 145 Trillion in the B2P
scenario). Thus, the modeling results confirm our initial hypothesis that emissions
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6We adopt the SRES-B2 scenario as a base case as it portrays an intermediary level of per capita GDP
growth in developing countries among the 4 SRES scenario families.
would tend to increase rather than decrease in the case of substantial slower economic
growth rates in the developing countries. This is in perfect agreement with both theory
and empirical observations. Thus, we continue to maintain that the lowest SRES
scenarios indeed represent a reasonable lower bound of future emissions in the
absence of climate policies. The same is the case with the highest of the SRES
emissions scenarios. We would welcome others to either corroborate our results, or
prove the contrary, ideally using an accepted, formal methodology that enables the
rigorous analysis of all salient interdependencies characteristic of the system drivers
of GHG emissions. However, we would be also interested in “back-of-the-envelope”
calculations. Given that C&H and we agree on the importance of the interrelationships
among the variables as described in an IPAT identity, the only way to benefit the
debate in a constructive manner is to work the numbers through in a consistent fashion,
refraining from simplistic, erroneous “pro-rata” scaling techniques. 
Table 1. Components of the IPAT identity and their growth rates
3.4 Economic growth rates
We maintain that the SRES scenarios reflect well our current understanding of the
uncertainties involved in future GHG emissions, including the issue of economic
growth. When the comparison is made at the level of the appropriate and comparable
metric (PPP or MER) the SRES scenarios compare well with the literature.7 This is
´ ´ ´
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7The A1B-AIM scenario portrays higher growth rates in the first decades of the next century, but lower ones
thereafter. When considered over the entire time period and in terms of resulting per capita income levels
by 2100, this scenario also lies within the range of comparable high growth scenarios available in the
literature as explained in our previous response to C&H.
amply illustrated in Table 2. It shows that regardless of whether MER or PPP is used
in a comparison with the underlying scenario literature with the same metric (MER or
PPP, respectively), the SRES scenarios – contrary to the claims by C&H – do not
appear at all extreme, especially when considering PPP, the preferred metric by C&H.
Rather, the scenarios reflect a wide range of future possibilities that characterize our
current understanding of the range of future economic growth in emission scenarios. 
Table 2. Economic growth in developing countries
C&H have in their critique used selective quotation in making their case. They have
excluded scenarios from the literature with high rates of economic growth and have
instead compared (high) MER growth rates in SRES scenarios with (low) PPP growth
rates from the literature. Such comparison of “apples with oranges”, i.e., MER and
PPP is inappropriate and misleading. This is perhaps best illustrated by Table 1 (p.
426) of their previous contribution to this Journal. In their comparison of the SRES
scenarios with the literature they first selected 5 high growth cases from the set of 40
SRES scenarios, but only 2 of the lower growth cases. In fact, in terms of economic
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growth there are only four major scenarios, referred to as scenario families in the
SRES report, so C&H choice of scenarios is skewed. They omitted in their comparison
with the literature precisely those PPP scenarios of the World Energy Council 1993
study they applaud earlier in their very paper. In conclusion, C&H have been seeding
confusion by inappropriately comparing MER and PPP growth rates reported in
different literature sources, as illustrated by both of their contributions to this Journal.
Table 2 corrects the comparison of SRES with other scenarios in the literature by
showing separately PPP and MER growth rates following the original C&H format. 
Further, C&H have misinformed readers by suggesting that in SRES per capita
incomes of developing countries would surpass those of the USA, whereas in reality
this is not the case in any SRES scenario. They have made these claims by attributing
to SRES unpublished and experimental attempts to downscale economic growth from
the 4 world regions of SRES to national levels. These unpublished attempts were
never agreed to by the SRES authors and were made well after the publication of
SRES. The SRES report contains information only at the level of 4 world regions. It
is also a well-established practice in science not to quote from unpublished work in
progress by others without seeking permission from the authors concerned. Even
though this downscaling exercise was neither a part of the SRES process nor is it in
any way connected to the SRES report as published, we wish to express our concern
here on the ridicule insinuated by C&H, both in academic journals and in the popular
press, of unpublished work in progress, out of context and without the consent of the
authors concerned.
4. CONCLUSION
We maintain that the SRES scenarios reflect well our current understanding of the
uncertainties involved in future GHG emissions, including the issue of economic
growth. When the comparison is made at the level of the appropriate and comparable
metric (PPP or MER) the SRES scenarios compare well with the literature. 
We express our hope, however, that despite disagreement on numbers and
economic metrics in long-term scenarios, C&H can join us in our plea for improved
clarity and precision and careful documentation of numbers, whether they refer to
MER or PPP. If this can be achieved, this debate might have finally resulted in
something useful as well.
We also call upon for greater efforts in clarifying differences in emissions
perspectives not only by qualitative critique but also through scenario quantifications.
We have taken note of the disagreement of C&H with some of the SRES scenarios but
continue to miss specific suggestions for improvement. 
Finally, we feel that in order to improve upon future work in this domain there is an
urgent need to rely more on the peer-review process and literature. We are confident that
a dialogue in rigorously peer-reviewed journals might help to eliminate much of the
spurious controversy to date and identify areas where further improvement of methods
and scenarios is required. A peer-reviewed evaluation of their criticisms could resolve
some of these issues and help inform future work in this area. Publication of alternative
emissions scenarios in the peer-reviewed literature are also a necessary precondition in
order that these can be given appropriate consideration in future scientific assessments.
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